

ABR

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Recruitment of Ukrainian Singletons

Attached are the underground's comments on the recruitment of
Ukrainian singletons.

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- 0 - COB
- 1 - SR
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- 2 - PLO
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20 September 1952

Subject: The Recruitment of Ukrainian Agents

1. For the past two years the possibility of recruiting Ukrainian agents with negligible entre group connections has been frequently discussed but to our knowledge little action has been taken. For this reason it is still a matter of conjecture whether an adequate number of Ukrainian agents can be recruited in Germany or for that matter any place else. Our last Ukrainian intelligence was the Ukrainian Cossack who was recruited by GRUZ, an agent operator in the Kudelskier Pz Camp. We must arrive at a definite answer as to whether or not slave agents can be recruited in Western Europe by GRU. If it is impossible to recruit agents outside of ethnic groups in Germany we recommend of several stations one only be handled as a secondary or peripheral assignment, this handles agents should be informed accordingly. We are at present better oriented on the Ukrainian emigration in Germany than in any other part of the world where Ukrainians congregate. For that reason if for no other, Ukraine is the logical place for the initial concerted attempt at recruitment. It is requested that GRU conduct the efforts of one or more case officers on this recruitment assignment and report not later than 1 November by each body for dispatch in spring 1952.
2. Here are a few informal suggestions on possible lines of approach:
 - a. Many Ukrainians DP's have been refused emigration out of Germany because of unfavorable post political or military connections. For many of these people the outlook for the future is fairly bleak. There must be some reason in this category who would be willing to undertake a long term assignment in exchange for the possibility of emigrating out of Western Europe.
 - b. Although we would prefer not to recruit or use the members of various entre political groups, some variety of entente or agent operator must be used because we have no case officers with unbreakable access to persons of the type we used to recruit. So long as we have no case officers who can tackle the problem of recruitment overtly and in person, we must use a covert or intermediary to do our security.

c. In the USSR case, GRUZ was not only taken account but he helped solve the difficulty caused by the contacts and origins of GRUZ (also GRUZ and other persons he provided to us) in the Ukrainian National body. In order the agent sponsor must also serve as a consolidator of the agent's connections, a security interlocutor and "bouncer", and to some extent a father confessor. The sponsor has to be trusted before he can do his job properly.



d. It goes without saying that my suggestion of Ukrainians such as the Guard Companies or NKVD trainees are easily susceptible recruitment pools. Approach to these pools by American case officers is not as complicated a security problem as an agent spotter at a DP camp would be.

e. There are of course in Germany many non-political groupings of Ukrainian men and women, for instance there are professional, social and charitable organizations which have not become completely sidetracked into the political arena. Perhaps the recruitment of singletons could be accomplished by a spotter in such a group. It follows that so long as we believe that it is to our interest to support only the resistance organization under CAMPION I we do not want to get involved with any group rivaling CAMPION I and preparing to start another underground in the Eastern Ukraine which will waste a lot of effort in trying to outshine CAMPION. In other words we do not want a singleton who is primarily or even secondarily interested in creating prestige in the Ukraine for an emigre group.

f. If you deem it expedient CAMPION may be utilized as an agent spotter. GUSSEK's connection with KARLOV described in MUR 4116 may also fit him for such a job. As far as the undersigned knows, these are the only two people whom we could use as agent spotters without waiting for additional operational clearances from headquarters. It is obvious that we need more CAMPIONs and CAMPIONs.

3. Miscellaneous comments:

a. To the best of our knowledge the only RISPOL operation involving a female singleton was mounted by [redacted] that are the reasons against parachuting a healthy, brown, young, Eastern Ukrainian peasant girl (or for that matter two) into her (their) homeland. The RIS has probably gathered by now that the AID is too shy to recruit female agents. Armed with this knowledge the RIS is able to save a lot of investigational time and trouble. The same comments apply to so-called family groups.

b. The Eastern Ukraine has more primary intelligence targets than the Western Ukraine. However there are far fewer Eastern Ukrainian emigres from which we can recruit. Probably in our present ignorance of local conditions in the Eastern Ukraine we are not in a position to give adequate briefing and training to an agent who has not been in the Eastern Ukraine since the end of the war. The same limitations apply to documentation as well. Foreign citizen singletons and other types who must exfiltrate themselves mainland in order to be of any value do not answer our problem. A great deal of time and effort goes into the training and dispatch of a singleton and if we are truthful with ourselves, we must admit that the odds against a singleton's being able to exfiltrate himself without help are not very high. It is therefore suggested that an effort be made to convince as many singletons as possible that they should remain in the

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Soviet Union until such a time as their chances for successful infiltration have been improved. If a singleton has contact with us via U/T there is at least a slight possibility that we could help him get out of the Soviet Union or otherwise help him to survive. Please therefore give full consideration to U/T training and equipment for singleton agents.

3. The advisability of training two or more singleton agents together should be carefully studied. The unfavorable security factors inherent in such an arrangement are sometimes outweighed by the drag on agent morale, training personnel and safe house facilities which the normal training or debriefing of an isolated individual has been known to involve.

4. Since blood-brother friendships are common among Slaves and two men can be expected to accomplish a more complicated mission than one man alone, it is suggested that full consideration be given to the recruitment and dispatch not only of singletons and teams but also of pairs and even "family groups."

4. A study of the recruitment possibilities in North and South America has already begun at headquarters. No recruiting will however be done until CCCB's experience in Germany is known to headquarters. It is much more difficult to determine the best methods for recruiting singletons in the United States and Canada, for very little is known in comparison to Germany about the behavior, availability and motivation of Ukrainian DP's who have so recently started new lives in this hemisphere.

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